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CONFRONTING THE GHOST:
LEGAL STRATEGIES TO OUST
MEDICAL GHOSTWRITERS
Deanna Minasi*
Articles published in medical journals contribute significantly to public
health by disseminating medical information to physicians, thereby
influencing prescribing practices. However, the information guiding
treatment decisions becomes distorted by selective publishing and medical
ghostwriting, which negatively affects overall patient care. Although there
is general consensus in the medical community that these practices of
publication bias represent a moral failing, the issue is rarely framed as a
wrong that necessitates legal consequences.
This Note takes the stance that medical ghostwriting constitutes an act
prohibited under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) and argues that physicians fraudulently named as authors should be
held civilly liable under RICO. This Note explores civil RICO, its origin, its
legislative and judicial history, and the evolution of RICO to areas beyond
traditional organized crime. By applying the elements of civil RICO to
medical ghostwriting, this Note argues that physicians named as authors who
knowingly fail to fulfill journal authorship criteria should be held
accountable for their role in disseminating misleading medical information.
This Note argues that, at the very least, current regulations governing the
medical publication framework should be better enforced and revised to
mandate authorship disclosure.
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INTRODUCTION
“[T]he medical journal, like the newspaper, is an ever-present friend whose
influence and advice are potent for good or evil.”1 This statement, made by
a Chicago physician in 1906, reveals that physicians have long recognized
the importance of medical journals. Since their development, medical
journals have done more than simply disseminate new knowledge of medical
treatments or therapeutic breakthroughs. These journals have articulated
norms of professional and social responsibility, established standards for
ethical research, and served as platforms for public health discussion.2 Yet,
like anything of great power, medical journals have the potential for evil—a
potential that, while articulated over a century ago, only recently fully
emerged.
By shaping medical knowledge, medical journals can play a direct role in
patient health. A 2014 study showed that nearly 75 percent of physicians
change their clinical practices quarterly or monthly based on reading the
results of medical research, and 16 percent of physicians reported saving a
patient’s life in the last year as a result of reading information in medical
1. Scott H. Podolsky et al., The Evolving Roles of the Medical Journal, 366 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1457, 1457 (2012) (quoting J.H. Salisbury, The Subordination of Medical Journals to
Proprietary Interests, 4 CAL. ST. J. MED. 247, 247 (1906)).
2. See id. at 1457–59.
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literature.3 As such, the research published in medical journals significantly
impacts physician treatment decisions. Medical research is not merely an
abstract scholarly pursuit; rather, it functions as a powerful tool used directly
to affect people’s lives.
To complicate matters, there is a tremendous amount of research
conducted in the United States. An estimated $59 billion is invested annually
by biopharmaceutical companies in research and development alone.4 This
vast amount of research is made accessible to physicians via medical
journals, which rely on peer review to ensure that manuscripts submitted for
publication are scientifically sound and accurate.5 While steps are in place
to promote accuracy and transparency, publishing bias is all too common,
which poses a major threat to public health.
Publication bias is driven by the tendency of physicians, reviewers, and
editors to submit or accept manuscripts for publication based on the direction
or strength of a study’s findings.6 Thus, authors and editors are more likely
to submit and publish, respectively, studies with positive results rather than
studies with negative results and are more likely to omit negative data.7 Drug
companies have an obvious financial interest in how their products are
presented in research publications, and the selection of positive trial results
is one way to present the product in a more favorable light. Further,
authorship of publications is highly sought after by physicians. For academic
investigators (physicians who serve as lead researchers), academic tenure
frequently depends on securing multiple publications in leading journals, and
collaboration with industry professionals heightens prestige and can result in
additional grant support.8 This combination of industry gain and personal
benefit creates an incentive to engage in practices of publication bias.
Misleading publications go far beyond simply misinforming doctors about
the benefits and harms of medical interventions. Through the doctors, these
articles leave patients exposed to potentially ineffective, unnecessary, or
harmful treatments. In a discipline grounded in principles of objective
science and ideals of nonmaleficence, the information underlying treatment
decisions has become muddled, which negatively affects patient care.

3. Survey: How Doctors Read and What It Means to Patients, BUS. WIRE (July 22, 2014),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140722005535/en/Survey-Doctors-ReadMeans-Patients [https://perma.cc/8V3Z-J797].
4. Press Release, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, PhRMA
Member Companies Invested $58.8 Billion in 2015 R&D (May 11, 2016),
http://phrma.org/press-release/phrma-member-companies-invested-58-8-billion-in-randd-in2015 [https://perma.cc/GU8W-VSM2].
5. See, e.g., Media Center Publication Process, NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE,
http://www.nejm.org/page/media-center/publication-process [https://perma.cc/5DTS-NSY2]
(last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
6. See Kay Dickersin, The Existence of Publication Bias and Risk Factors for Its
Occurrence, 263 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1385, 1385 (1990).
7. See id. at 1385–86.
8. Xavier Bosch & Joseph S. Ross, Commentary, Ghostwriting: Research Misconduct,
Plagiarism, or Fool’s Gold?, 125 AM. J. MED. 324, 324 (2012).
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While there is a general consensus that publication bias constitutes a moral
failing,9 the issue is rarely framed as a wrong deserving of legal consequence.
Indeed, those who have been exposed for engaging in these practices have
suffered only minimal professional or academic consequences,10 creating a
culture of permissible dishonesty. Drawing on the few articles that merge
law and medicine in the realm of publication, this Note argues that certain
biased practices constitute fraudulent behavior.
Part I of this Note explores the connected practices of selective publishing
and medical ghostwriting and their real-world effect on public health. This
Part also introduces the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) and discusses how the statute’s legislative and judicial history
mandates a liberal interpretation, promoting applicability to areas beyond
traditional organized crime. Part II argues that medical ghostwriting
constitutes an act prohibited under civil RICO and that physicians
fraudulently named as authors should be held civilly liable. While
acknowledging civil RICO as a viable tool to combat medical ghostwriting,
Part III proposes less drastic solutions to the current medical publication
framework that avoid placing liability on physicians. This Part offers greater
enforcement of current Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation and
the implementation of a mandatory disclosure rule as possible solutions.
While avoiding constitutional concerns, these solutions consider the practical
needs of the pharmaceutical industry and offer a realistic means of addressing
medical publication bias.
I. PUBLISHING BIAS IN MEDICAL RESEARCH
AND AN INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL RICO
Part I.A provides a basic overview of the FDA’s drug approval process.11
Next, Parts I.B and C address industry practices that contribute to medical
publication bias: the selective publication of medical research and medical
ghostwriting. Part I.D then explains that a litigatory approach to combating
publication bias is possible.
A. The Approval Process for FDA-Regulated Drugs
To market a drug for human use in the United States, a manufacturer
(typically a pharmaceutical or biotechnology company) needs the approval
of the FDA, the federal agency that determines whether available evidence
demonstrates that a drug is safe and efficacious.12 The approval process
begins with the manufacturer submitting an application to the FDA that
contains the results of preclinical animal tests, manufacturing information,
9. See id. (explaining that the practice of ghostwriting is perceived as a “slight, easily
comprehensible moral failing, rather than as unethical”).
10. Id.
11. For a more detailed explanation of the drug approval process, see Martin S. Lipsky &
Lisa K. Sharp, From Idea to Market: The Drug Approval Process, 14 J. AM. BOARD FAM.
PRAC. 362 (2001).
12. See Gerrit M. Beckhaus, A New Prescription to Balance Secrecy and Disclosure in
Drug-Approval Processes, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 135, 135 (2012).
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investigator information, and clinical protocols.13 The application proceeds
if “sufficient hints of drug efficacy” are shown to warrant human testing.14
The drug then enters three phases of clinical trials.15 If the drug passes the
third extensive phase of testing, a new drug application (NDA) is submitted
to the FDA for approval.16 The NDA contains detailed information regarding
the drug’s composition, results of preclinical and clinical trials, the drug’s
behavior in the body, and how the drug is manufactured, processed, and
packaged.17 At that stage, the FDA can approve or reject the application or
request further study before making a decision.18 On average, the entire
process takes eight to twelve years and may cost over $500 million.19 But
the development of new drugs is an important part of modern medicine, and
clinical trials are an essential aspect of that development.
B. Selective Publishing of Clinical Trial Results
Publication bias favors the dissemination of information about medical
interventions that show a statistically significant benefit.20 One form of
publication bias is selective publishing, which occurs when journals publish
favorable clinical trials that promote the use of a drug but fail to publish trials
yielding unfavorable results.21 This practice not only has the potential to lead
to preferential prescribing of drugs with underestimated harms but also limits
the number and scope of studies available for review by clinicians.22
Ultimately, through selective publication, unrealistic estimates of drug
effectiveness may alter a drug’s apparent risk-to-benefit ratio, leading to
inappropriate treatment decisions.23
Many reports illuminate the existence of selective publishing, suggesting
that it represents a deeply rooted problem in the medical community.24 These
reports show that published literature conveying drug efficacy does not
accurately reflect drug efficacy according to FDA reviews, which contain

13. See id. at 138.
14. See id. at 139.
15. See id. Phase I determines the drug’s general safety and profile by testing the drug on
twenty to eighty healthy volunteers. Id. If not inordinately toxic, the drug moves on to Phase
II, where well-controlled clinical studies are conducted on several hundred patients with the
condition the drug is intended to improve. Id. These studies obtain data on the drug’s
effectiveness, common short-term side effects, and risks. Id. In Phase III, large-scale,
randomized trials are conducted on several hundred to several thousand people to gather
additional information on effectiveness and safety. Id. at 139–40.
16. Id. at 139.
17. Id. at 139–40.
18. Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 11, at 364.
19. Id.
20. Kristin Rising et al., Reporting Bias in Drug Trials Submitted to the Food and Drug
Administration: Review of Publication and Presentation, 5 PLOS MED. 1561, 1562 (2008).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Erick H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and Its Influence
on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252, 259 (2008).
24. See Dickersin, supra note 6, at 1386 (noting that the first professional critique of the
problem of publishing positive results and rejecting negative findings arose in the 1950s).
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information on all trials submitted to the regulator.25 In a study published in
The New England Journal of Medicine, researchers reviewed clinical trials
of twelve antidepressant drugs approved by the FDA between 1987 and 2004
and compared the results of the FDA-reviewed trials to those published in
medical journals.26 If selective publishing did not exist, the FDA reviews
and the publications would contain the same information. Yet the findings
revealed a bias toward the publication of positive results.
According to the FDA review, seventy-four studies were conducted
representing 12,500 patients’ worth of data, while the published literature
presented a total of only fifty-one studies.27 No evidence of publication was
found for twenty-three of the FDA-reviewed studies, accounting for data
from 3449 study participants.28 Out of the FDA-reviewed studies, thirtyeight were deemed to have positive results.29 The published literature,
however, reported forty-eight of the studies positively.30 Thus, according to
the published literature, the results of all but three studies were positive.31
The study also found that the published literature presented an effect size, or
assessment of treatment efficacy, nearly one-third larger than the effect size
from the FDA data.32
A comparative analysis in the Stanford Law and Policy Review explored
the specific strategies employed by industries to manipulate the reporting of
research.33 The analysis found that, in comparison to other industries, the
pharmaceutical industry publishes more research that supports its interests
and suppresses more research in cases where the results do not support the
industry’s interests.34 The article concluded that pharmaceutical companies
used peer-reviewed publications as a marketing tool.35 After all, once a drug
25. See, e.g., Rising, supra note 20, at 1562 (presenting findings from an observational
study of efficacy trials of approved NDAs for New Molecular Entities from 2001 to 2002 and
noting that (1) many trials had not been published and (2) discrepancies existed between the
FDA-reviewed trial information and information found in publications, leading to more
favorable presentations of the NDA drugs in the publications); see also Turner, supra note 23,
at 259.
26. Turner, supra note 23, at 253.
27. Id. at 255 tbl.1.
28. Id. The researchers noted there may be many reasons why study results are not
published. Id. at 259.
29. Id. at 254.
30. Id. at 254–55.
31. Id. at 256 figs.1–2.
32. Id. at 255–56.
33. See generally Jenny White & Lisa A. Bero, Corporate Manipulation of Research:
Strategies Are Similar Across Five Industries, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105 (2010)
(providing a systematic examination of the strategies industries use to manipulate research to
promote the industry’s products, thereby enhancing credibility and profits).
34. Id. at 109 tbl.1. The study also included the tobacco, lead, vinyl chloride, and silicosisgenerating industries. Id. at 106. The categories of research manipulation studied were (1)
funding of research that supports industry interests, (2) publication of research that supports
industry interests, (3) suppression of industry-sponsored research when results do not support
industry interests, (4) distortion of public discourse on research, (5) setting of scientific
standards favorable to the industry, and (6) dissemination of favorable research directly to the
public. Id. at 108.
35. Id. at 130.
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is approved for sale, the pharmaceutical company is tasked with selling its
drug to the only people who can make it available to patients—physicians,
who turn to the published medical research for guidance.
While these reports demonstrate that selective publishing exists, they fail
to show the consequences of the biases. It is therefore necessary to identify
concrete examples of the resulting harm. From the mid-1990s to the early
2000s, a number of highly publicized incidents occurred involving attempts
to manipulate clinical research publication.36 Of particular importance is the
2004 litigation between New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer and drug
giant GlaxoSmithKline (“Glaxo”).37
As the first suit to allege the illegality of data suppression, Spitzer accused
Glaxo of “repeated and persistent fraud” in violation of New York consumer
protection law.38 Specifically, the complaint identified five studies of Paxil
use among children and adolescents.39 It alleged that two of Glaxo’s studies
failed to show that the drug was more effective than a placebo for treating
depression, and three showed that suicide-related behaviors were twice as
likely among Paxil users.40 However, out of the five studies, only one study
was published in a prominent journal, and it suggested favorable results.41
Not long after the complaint was filed, Glaxo settled for $2.5 million and
agreed to post all clinical trial results on its website, an unusual move for a
pharmaceutical company.42 Even with a quick settlement, the suit
established a new standard with regard to disclosure, drastically altering the
nature of the industry’s handling of clinical trial results.43 Perhaps in direct
response, the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE)
announced that their journals44 would require registration in a public clinical
36. See Laurence J. Hirsch, Commentary, Conflicts of Interest, Authorship, and
Disclosures in Industry-Related Scientific Publications: The Tort Bar and Editorial Oversight
of Medical Journals, 84 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 811, 812 (2009). Manipulations included
blocking of publication by contractual means, withholding study data from investigators, and
reporting a twelve-month study as a six-month trial that provided misleading favorable results
without explanation of the changed reporting period. Id.
37. Complaint, People v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 2, 2004),
http://news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/glaxo/nyagglaxo60204cmp.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4N3GCFK].
38. Id. at 1; see Barbara Martinez, Spitzer Charges Glaxo Concealed Paxil Data, WALL
ST.
J.
(June
3,
2004),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108618482620826827
[https://perma.cc/GB5S-99UQ].
39. Complaint, supra note 37, at 5; see also Martinez, supra note 38.
40. Complaint, supra note 37, at 5; see also Martinez, supra note 38. According to the
complaint, one unpublished study showed that 7.7 percent of the youth on Paxil had suicidal
thinking and acts compared with 3 percent of the placebo group. Complaint, supra note 37, at
11; see also Martinez, supra note 38.
41. Martinez, supra note 38.
42. See Jaime Holguin, Glaxo Settles Paxil Lawsuit, CBS NEWS (June 3, 2004),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/glaxo-settles-paxil-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/Y5NN-4HYH].
43. Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Settlement Sets New
Standard For Release of Drug Information (Aug. 26, 2004), http://www.ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/settlement-sets-new-standard-release-drug-information
[https://perma.cc/R249SZZ7].
44. Almost 3000 journals are listed as following the ICMJE guidance. Journals Following
ICMJE
Recommendations,
INT’L
COMMISSION
MED.
J.
EDITORS,
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trials registry as a condition of publication consideration.45 The ICMJE
asserted the policy was necessary to establish full transparency with respect
to the performance and reporting of clinical trials.46 Indeed, one of the
explicit purposes of clinical trial registration is to prevent selective
publication and selective reporting of research outcomes.47
These events likely contributed to the passage of Title VIII of the Food and
Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA),48 which
established legal requirements for study sponsors and investigators to report
specified clinical trial information for certain applicable clinical trials on the
online national registry, managed by the National Library of Medicine at the
National Institutes of Health (NIH).49 Specifically, the statute requires
registration at the outset of the study50 and disclosure of trial results within
twelve months of study completion.51 Congress’ main intention in enacting
Title VIII was doubtless to improve transparency of clinical research. During
a 2007 House of Representatives hearing, Senator Charles Grassley testified
that the bill would
expand an existing public data base by mandating the registry of all clinical
trials and the results of those trials. This reform is key to establishing
greater transparency regarding clinical trials, the good ones and the bad
ones, and to hold drug makers and drug regulators accountable and to give
doctors all the information they can to their patients.52

The statute established registration requirements and provided a legally
defined timeline with specific mandates for the reporting of trial results.53
Because publication bias is still prevalent years after the FDAAA’s
enactment, however, compliance with Title VIII remains an issue.
http://www.icmje.org/journals-following-the-icmje-recommendations/
[https://perma.cc/RD7S-ZLBS] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
45. Catherine D. DeAngelis et al., Editorial, Clinical Trial Registration: A Statement from
the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1250, 1250–
51 (2004).
46. Id. at 1251.
47. Clinical Trial Registration, INT’L COMMISSION MED. J. EDITORS,
http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/publishing-and-editorial-issues/clinical-trialregistration.html [https://perma.cc/U9BF-GRN8] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
48. Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 801, 121 Stat. 823, 904 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)
(2012)).
49. Deborah A. Zarin et al., Trial Reporting in ClinicalTrials.gov—The Final Rule, 375
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1998, 1998 (2016).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(2)(C). Information to be reported in the registry includes
descriptive information regarding study design and recruitment, as well as contact and
administrative information. Id. § 282(j)(2)(A)(ii).
51. Id. § 282(j)(4)(C)(i)(I). The completion date is defined as the date that the “final
subject was examined or received an intervention for the purposes of final collection of data
for the primary outcome” and thus, does not include time or care related to secondary
outcomes. Id. § 282(j)(1)(A)(v). Additionally, because the completion date relates to last
patient care date, the FDAAA applies to discontinued trials. Id.
52. The Adequacy of FDA to Assure the Nation’s Drug Supply: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the S. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th
Cong. (2007) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG110hhrg35502/html/CHRG-110hhrg35502.htm [https://perma.cc/RYT6-KHS2].
53. Zarin, supra note 49, at 1998.
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According to a recent report, the national registry currently has more than
224,000 study records54 but compliance with the reporting requirements has
been low, partly due to ambiguous statutory requirements.55 One study
showed that after twelve months, the end of the statutory reporting period,
results were reported for only 17 percent of trials funded by the industry, 8.1
percent of trials funded by the NIH, and 5.7 percent of trials funded by other
government or academic institutions.56 In an effort to promote compliance,
the FDA issued a final rule57 in September 2016, which clarified the
registration and reporting requirements for the regulated community,58
interpreted ambiguous key statutory provisions, and developed additional
requirements necessary to further the goal of transparency.59
The enactment of the final rule validates the FDAAA’s commitment to
maintaining public trust and encouraging advances in the design, conduct,
and oversight of clinical trials.60 Organizations will need to ensure that their
systems and procedures promote complete and timely clinical trial reporting.
Yet the specifics of how and under what circumstances the agencies will seek
to enforce the requirements are not included in the final rule.61 Instead, the
NIH stated that it expects the “clarification of responsibilities and obligations
in this final rule will lead to a high level of voluntary compliance with these
requirements.”62 In an effort to raise awareness of the procedures and
penalties of noncompliance, the final rule describes the potential legal
consequences of violating Title VIII, which include civil damages.63
While the effects of the final rule are not yet known, compliance with Title
VIII is merely the first step in addressing bias in publication. In theory,
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Monique L. Anderson et al., Compliance with Results Reporting at ClincialTrials.gov,
372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1031, 1034–37 (2015). After five years, these numbers only marginally
increased. Results had been reported by 41.5 percent of trials funded by industry, 38.9 percent
of those funded by the NIH, and 27.7 percent of those funded by other government or academic
institutions. Id. at 1034.
57. See generally Clinical Trials Registration and Results Information Submission, 81
Fed. Reg. 64,982 (Sept. 21, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 11). For discussion of the
key issues that the final rule addresses, see Zarin, supra note 49, at 1998.
58. Additionally, the NIH—the largest public funder of clinical trials in the United States,
which invests more than $3 billion annually—has issued a complementary policy to cover all
NIH-funded trials, including those not subject to regulation. See Kathy L. Hudson et al.,
Opinion, Toward a New Era of Trust and Transparency in Clinical Trials, 316 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 1353, 1353–54 (2016). Requirements include submitting applications that contain
specific information about protocols and other information necessary for effective peer review.
Id. Noncompliance will result in the NIH withholding funding to grantee institutions. Id.
59. See Zarin, supra note 49, at 1999.
60. Hudson, supra note 58, at 1354.
61. See 42 C.F.R. pt. 11 (2016).
62. Clinical Trials Registration and Results Information Submission, 81 Fed. Reg. at
65,117.
63. 42 C.F.R. § 11.66. Specifically, if the secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services determines that any clinical trial information was not submitted as required
or was false or misleading, the secretary must notify the responsible party and give it an
opportunity to remedy the noncompliance within thirty days. Id. § 11.66(a)(2). If the violation
is not corrected within that time, the person is subject to a civil monetary penalty of not more
than $10,000 per day until the violation is corrected. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) (2012).
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complete disclosure of clinical trial results grants physicians access to both
negative and positive results, allowing for informed treatment decisions; in
practice, however, physicians rely on medical journals for this information.64
Regulating the published information and ensuring the validity of that
information must therefore be a goal of reform.
C. Ghostwriting in Medical Journals
Medical ghostwriting is the practice of hiring medical education,
marketing, or communications companies to draft articles that are presented
to prominent physicians65 to sign on as authors.66 Ghostwritten articles can
be drafted by pharmaceutical companies that are not acknowledged in final
publication and include review articles,67 editorials, and primary research
papers.68 These ghostwritten articles contravene journal authorship
requirements but are nevertheless published.69 Physicians who agree to serve
as authors may be unfamiliar with underlying data or relevant research and
may have provided only limited input.70 While the manufacturer benefits
from the promotion of its product, the authors also benefit, as successful
publications increase their prestige and may lead to promotions or more
research funding opportunities.71
Because ghostwritten articles often contain selective clinical trial results,
they can have a significant impact on physician prescribing practices. When
a prominent physician lends his or her name to such an article, the perceived
credibility of the findings and conclusions is heightened, thereby influencing

64. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
65. The term “physicians” in this Note refers not only to practicing physicians but also to
scientists and medical academics.
66. SEN. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, S. COMM. ON FIN., 111TH CONG., GHOSTWRITING IN
MEDICAL
LITERATURE
1,
2
(2010)
[hereinafter
GRASSLEY
REPORT],
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/about/upload/Senator-Grassley-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C3EB-HKU8].
67. A review article is an article in which an author examines a large body of medical
research and offers a bottom-line judgment about how to treat a particular ailment. See Natasha
Singer, Medical Papers by Ghostwriters Pushed Therapy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/health/research/05ghost.html?pagewanted=all
[https://perma.cc/P8X3-5VQ2].
68. See GRASSLEY REPORT, supra note 66, at 2.
69. ICMJE recommends that authorship be based on the following four criteria:
(1) “[s]ubstantial contributions to the conception or design of the work; or the acquisition,
analysis, or interpretation of data for the work”; (2) “[d]rafting the work or revising it critically
for important intellectual content”; (3) “[f]inal approval of the version to be published”; and
(4) “[a]greement to be accountable for all aspects of the work in ensuring that questions related
to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the work are appropriately investigated and
resolved.” Defining the Role of Authors and Contributors, INT’L COMMITTEE MED. J. EDITORS,
http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/roles-and-responsibilities/defining-the-roleof-authors-and-contributors.html [https://perma.cc/D5KP-9LLQ] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
The ICMJE further recommends that “authors should meet all four criteria for authorship, and
all who meet the four criteria should be identified as authors. Those who do not meet all four
criteria should be acknowledged.” Id.
70. GRASSLEY REPORT, supra note 66, at 2.
71. See id. at 15.
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readers’ treatment decisions.72 The warranty of authorship influences the
article’s integrity and quality, making it unsurprising that knowledge of
ghostwriting reduces the credibility of the publication.73 It is therefore in the
pharmaceutical company’s best interest not to disclose true authorship, since
these articles play an important role in the marketing and sale of their drugs.
Ghostwriting functions as a way for pharmaceutical companies to “covertly
shape the medical literature in favor of [their] commercial interests.”74
To assess the prevalence of inappropriate authorship in the form of
honorary and ghost authors, editors of The Journal of the American Medical
Association (JAMA) surveyed authors published in six leading medical
journals in 2008.75 Online questionnaires completed by 630 authors show
that the prevalence of articles with honorary authorship, ghost authorship, or
both was 21 percent.76 Specifically, ghostwriting was reported at a rate of
7.9 percent in JAMA, 7.7 percent in PLOS Medicine, 7.6 percent in The
Lancet, 4.9 percent in The Annals of Internal Medicine, and 2.1 percent in
Nature Medicine.77 The New England Journal of Medicine reported the
highest rate among the journals at 11 percent.78 The reported rates increased
for honorary authorship, with Nature Medicine reporting the highest rate at
29.3 percent and The New England Journal of Medicine reporting the lowest
rate at 12.2 percent.79 Less than one-fifth of the articles surveyed included
acknowledgment sections that identified contributions such as review,
comments, and analysis.80 While these statistics may seem insubstantial, the
six journals examined are considered to be among the most influential
journals in medicine and all have rigorous authorship guidelines.81 Thus, the
editors who conducted the study suspect that the prevalence of inappropriate
authorship could be higher in journals with more relaxed standards.82
72. Id. at 2.
73. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Lacasse & Jonathan Leo, Knowledge of Ghostwriting and
Financial Conflicts-of-Interest Reduces the Perceived Credibility of Biomedical Research,
BMC RES. NOTES, Jan. 2011, at 1 (assessing the impact of several conflicts of interest,
including ghostwriting, on the perceived credibility of biomedical research among practicing
clinicians). Two versions of a fictional antidepressant study were presented to hospital
personnel—one disclosed conflicts of interest and the other did not. Id. at 2. Perceived
credibility ratings were lower in the study that disclosed conflicts of interests, and clinicians
relying on that study were less likely to recommend the antidepressant. Id. at 3–4.
74. See Jeffrey R. Lacasse & Jonathan Leo, Ghostwriting at Elite Academic Medical
Centers in the United States, PLOS MED., Feb. 2010, at 1.
75. See Joseph S. Wislar et al., Honorary and Ghost Authorship in High Impact
Biomedical Journals: A Cross Sectional Survey, BMJ, Oct. 2011, at 1. ICMJE authorship
criteria was used to define honorary authors as individuals who are named as authors but who
have not met authorship criteria and ghost authors as individuals who have made substantial
contributions to the work reported in an article but who are not named as authors. Id. at 1–2.
For the purposes of this Note, “ghostwriting” includes both honorary authors and ghost
authors.
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id. at 7 tbl.1.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Additionally, while respondents were assured confidentiality, underreporting
of honorary and ghost authorship was expected, indicating that the results do
not reveal the true extent of inappropriate authorship.83
The prevalence of ghostwriting fails to give credence to its dangerous
consequences. The highly publicized Merck case provides an example.
Before the pharmaceutical giant Merck voluntarily pulled its multibilliondollar drug Vioxx from the market, the FDA warned Merck that its
promotional campaign minimized potentially serious cardiovascular risks.84
The FDA instructed the company to contact physicians to “correct false or
misleading impressions and information” that it had disseminated through
advertisements and publications.85 Despite these warnings, the drug
remained on the market for three more years, possibly contributing to nearly
28,000 heart attacks and deaths over four years.86
Merck’s handling of Vioxx spurred litigation that triggered the medical
community to examine Merck’s internal documents in an effort to better
understand collaborations between the pharmaceutical industry and medical
After reviewing 250 documents, a pattern emerged
profession.87
demonstrating that Merck prepared manuscripts for its own clinical trials and
recruited external, academically affiliated physicians to be honorary
authors.88 The documents revealed that the clinical trials and analyses of
manuscripts were completed before the physicians became involved.89
Documents also described contracts between Merck employees and medical
publishing companies providing for ghostwriting, reviews, and recruitment
of external physician as authors.90 Merck compensated some physicians who
agreed to serve as authors of ghostwritten manuscripts with honoraria ranging
from $750 to $2500.91
Another example of how the consequences of ghostwriting are not known
until thousands of patients’ lives are negatively affected involves Wyeth’s
treatment of its hormone drugs. Documents unveiled during litigation show
that Wyeth paid ghostwriters to produce twenty-six articles that were
83. Id.
84. After spending only a few years on the market, Vioxx was voluntarily pulled after
outside researchers continuously raised the possibility that Vioxx might be a danger to the
heart, linking the painkiller to an increased risk of heart attacks, strokes, and deaths. See Alex
Berenson et al., Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took Long Path to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 14, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/business/despite-warnings-drug-gianttook-long-path-to-vioxx-recall.html [https://perma.cc/978Q-B8SF].
85. Id.
86. See Bloomberg News, F.D.A. Releases Memo on Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/03/business/fda-releases-memo-on-vioxx.html
[https://perma.cc/644W-M2ET].
87. See generally Joseph S. Ross et al., Guest Authorship and Ghostwriting in
Publications Related to Rofecoxib: A Case Study of Industry Documents from Rofecoxib
Litigation, 299 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1800 (2008).
88. Id. at 1801–02. Specifically, a Merck employee was found to be the author of the first
draft of the manuscript; however, in the published articles, the first author was an external,
academically affiliated investigator. Id. at 1803.
89. Id. at 1802.
90. Id. at 1803–04.
91. Id. at 1806.
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published in eighteen medical journals between 1998 and 2005.92 These
articles emphasized the benefits and deemphasized the risks of its hormone
drugs without disclosing Wyeth’s role in initiating or financing the studies.93
The true nature of these risks, however, were disclosed to the public after a
2002 federally funded study found that the hormones increased the risk of
breast cancer, heart disease, and stroke in menopausal women, leading to the
filing of nearly 8000 lawsuits.94
Practices like those of Merck and Wyeth led to a report by the Senate
Finance Committee, helmed by Senator Charles Grassley, that described a
two-year investigation into pharmaceutical industry influence over academia
and medical ghostwriting.95 The report found that, despite past litigation
exposing ghostwriting, pharmaceutical companies’ role in medical
publications remained veiled or undisclosed.96 The report also focused on
academia, finding that, while their ability to detect ghostwriting is limited,
only a small number of major medical schools have explicitly banned the
practice.97 Similarly, it found that journal criteria on authorship requirements
had a limited effect on ghostwriting despite journals’ explicit prohibition of
the practice.98
Dr. Joseph S. Ross, an assistant professor at Mount Sinai School of
Medicine, likened the practice of medical ghostwriting to “steroids and
baseball,” stating, “You don’t know who was using and who wasn’t; you
don’t know which articles are tainted and which aren’t.”99 Ghostwriting
raises concerns for physicians who rely on medical literature to inform their
practice. Because patient care is guided by these publications, this Note
explores ways to ensure the validity of the literature used by prescribing
physicians. While regulatory reform of the current medical publication
framework will be addressed, the practice of ghostwriting presents an
opportunity for a litigatory approach to the issue.
D. The Potential for Legal Action
Against Medical Ghostwriting
Although the practice of ghostwriting is well known in the medical
community, the legal world has been slow to address the issue. With few
legal avenues available and no precedent to support a claim, two law
92. See Singer, supra note 67.
93. See id.; see also Duff Wilson, Wyeth’s Use of Medical Ghostwriters Questioned, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/13/business/13wyeth.html
[https://perma.cc/FZ8S-EYM6] (explaining that documents revealed a “publication plan
tracking report” by Wyeth showing “articles in which manuscripts were completed by the
company before they were sent to the putative author for review, and any revisions were
subject to final approval from the company”).
94. See Singer, supra note 67.
95. See generally GRASSLEY REPORT, supra note 66.
96. See id. at 4–7.
97. See id. at 7–11. Out of the ten leading medical schools the report examined, six had
policies explicitly prohibiting ghostwriting: Columbia, Johns Hopkins, Stanford, University
of California, San Francisco, University of Washington, and Washington University. Id. at 7.
98. See id. at 11–14.
99. See Singer, supra note 67.
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professors published an article that proposed using civil RICO to combat
ghostwriting.100 At first glance, RICO seems an unlikely statute to be
discussed in the same breath as medical publishing, but an understanding of
civil RICO’s application and history can help to illustrate how the statute can
be applied to areas beyond traditional organized crime.
Congress enacted RICO as part of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970 (OCCA) to combat the influence of organized crime on interstate
commerce.101 The statute provides for both criminal and civil penalties for
acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal enterprise.102 RICO permits
the government and private plaintiffs to bring civil actions in either state or
federal court,103 and, under § 1964(c), is available to “[a]ny person injured in
his business or property by reason of a violation” of RICO.104 Those found
civilly liable must pay treble damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs.105
The availability of treble damages, combined with the statute’s broad and
liberal construction, has turned civil RICO into the weapon of choice for
plaintiffs. It has the potential to serve as a valuable tool for medical
ghostwriting plaintiffs as well.
II. PUBLICATION BIAS AS
A VIOLATION OF CIVIL RICO
Though it was first enacted in response to growing crime syndicates, civil
RICO has been stretched to areas far beyond traditional organized crime.
This Part explores how a broad application of RICO could include medical
ghostwriting. Part II.A describes how, historically, the pharmaceutical
industry has been held liable for medical ghostwriting, while individual
physicians have escaped liability. Next, Part II.B examines the history of
RICO and the support for a liberal interpretation of the statute. Finally, Part
II.C discusses the elements under § 1962(c) that a plaintiff must prove to
pursue a successful RICO claim and applies those elements to the practice of
medical ghostwriting.
A. The Sole Wrongdoer:
Pharmaceutical Industry Is Held Liable
The Glaxo, Merck, and Wyeth examples demonstrate that issues of
publication bias are only brought to light after public health has been
100. See generally Simon Stern & Trudo Lemmens, Legal Remedies for Medical
Ghostwriting: Imposing Fraud Liability on Guest Authors of Ghostwritten Articles, PLOS
MED., Aug. 2011.
101. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
102. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963–1964 (2012). RICO may provide equitable relief through
divestiture of the defendant’s interest in the enterprise, restrictions on the defendant’s future
activities or investments, and dissolution or reorganization of the enterprise. Id. § 1964(a).
103. Id. § 1964(b)–(c); see also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (holding that
state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising under § 1964(c)).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
105. A successful plaintiff may recover three times the damages sustained and the cost of
the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. Id.

2017]

CONFRONTING THE GHOST

313

compromised. Typically, however, the manufacturer is held solely
responsible for its wrongdoing, as healthcare fraud allegations and
subsequent payouts are commonplace in the pharmaceutical world.106 For
example, in addition to paying $4.85 billion to settle thousands of personal
injury suits, Merck paid $950 million and pleaded guilty to a criminal
misdemeanor charge for its illegal promotion107 of Vioxx to treat rheumatoid
arthritis before the FDA approved it for that purpose.108 Merck also faced
civil claims under the False Claims Act for making false statements to state
Medicaid agencies about Vioxx’s cardiovascular safety and for making
“inaccurate, unsupported, or misleading” statements to increase sales of the
drug, resulting in payments by the federal government.109 Most recently,
Merck settled a securities class action suit brought by its shareholders for
$830 million.110 Although the total costs to Merck exceed $6 billion,
litigation of this nature is viewed merely as “a cost of doing business.”111
Further, while publishing bias necessarily functions as a factor in these
claims, neither selective publishing nor ghostwriting were identified as acts
of fraudulent behavior. And, perhaps most alarmingly, no individual was
held responsible.
Noticeably absent from litigation involving the pharmaceutical industry is
any mention of the physicians who agreed to author ghostwritten papers.
While the pharmaceutical industry is surely at fault for facilitating the
drafting of the articles, the authors who fail to fulfill authorship criteria
should also face legal liability.
B. A Liberal Interpretation of Civil RICO
Facilitates Its Broad Application
An examination of RICO’s legislative and judicial history is essential to
understanding how civil RICO can stretch beyond traditional organized
crime to apply to medical publishing.

106. In 2011, the Wall Street Journal stated that a recent Merck settlement was the “latest
big payout by a drug company to settle health-care fraud allegations,” noting that
GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Pfizer Inc., Eli Lilly & Co., and AstraZeneca PLC have also reached
costly settlements in recent years. See Peter Loftus & Brent Kendall, Merck to Pay $950
Million in Vioxx Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052970204531404577054472253737682 [https://perma.cc/5UY2-GU4X].
107. Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, manufacturers are prohibited from marketing
drugs for any uses except those the FDA has determined are safe. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
108. See Duff Wilson, Merck to Pay $950 Million Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/business/merck-agrees-to-pay-950-million-in-vioxxcase.html [https://perma.cc/79CW-XMPC].
109. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Nearly $1 Billion
Civil and Criminal Resolution with Merck Sharp and Dohme Over Promotion of Vioxx (Nov.
22,
2011),
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm280985.htm
[https://perma.cc/A7HR-G7QQ].
110. See Peter Loftus, Merck to Pay $830 Million to Settle Vioxx Shareholder Suit, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/merck-to-pay-830-million-to-settle-vioxxshareholder-suit-1452866882 [https://perma.cc/ADY8-JL8V].
111. See Wilson, supra note 108.
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1. Legislative History
This Part explores civil RICO’s legislative history by dividing it into two
time periods of statutory construction surrounding the enactment of
§ 1962(c): preliberalization and postliberalization.
Congress originally enacted RICO to combat the criminal infiltration of
American business and trade.112 By the 1950s, concern about the national
reach of crime syndicates became pervasive, leading Congress to investigate
the nature of these networks.113 The congressional investigations revealed
for the first time that the suspected crime syndicates were operating through
infiltration, a novel form of criminal activity in which the profits of organized
crime were used to buy and operate legitimate business enterprises, reaching
across almost every business sector.114 These alarming results led to the
establishment of the Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice, which issued a task report focusing on the
organized nature of the crime syndicates rather than trying to prevent
individual crimes from occurring.115 This focus on the infiltration of
legitimate business proved foundational for RICO, spurring a series of
legislative measures that eventually led to the statute’s enactment.116
The original legislation that evolved into RICO attempted to punish either
the investment of illegitimate profits into legitimate businesses or the
acquisition of an interest in legitimate businesses by illegitimate means.117
Recognizing that the imprisonment of an organized crime leader did not
eradicate a syndicate, RICO targeted the economic base to drain the
organization’s source of income.118 This purpose is explicit in the first two
substantive crimes created by RICO. Section 1962(a) prohibits the use of
income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest
in an enterprise.119 Section 1962(b) prohibits the acquisition or maintenance
of an interest in or control of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity.120
Congress radically expanded RICO beyond its original intent with the
addition of subsection (c),121 which made it a crime not only to acquire an
enterprise by racketeering but also to conduct the affairs of an enterprise by
112. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 9569 (1969) (noting the Senate Committee’s determination
that “organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and
widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America’s economy”).
113. Miranda Lievsay, Note, Containing the Uncontainable: Drawing RICO’s Border with
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1735, 1739 (2016).
114. Id. at 1739–40. Major industries such as banking and insurance, as well as small
businesses such as restaurants and hotels were involved in this infiltration. Id. at 1740.
115. Id. at 1740.
116. Id. at 1741.
117. Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical, and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43
VAND. L. REV. 769, 770, 773 (1990) (dismantling the myth that the original package of
legislation was aimed at punishing membership in organized crime).
118. Lievsay, supra note 113, at 1741.
119. Lynch, supra note 117, at 770; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(b) (2012).
120. Lynch, supra note 117, at 770; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b).
121. Lynch, supra note 117, at 774.
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a pattern of racketeering.122 Thus, § 1962(c) makes anyone who engages in
a pattern of criminal acts while managing any legitimate enterprise guilty of
a RICO offense.123 While the other provisions have limited application,
§ 1962(c) “has proved almost infinitely adaptable” and has been used in the
overwhelming majority of RICO cases.124
Since the inception of § 1962(c), courts have broadly interpreted RICO to
include defendants who do not fit the conventional conception of a
participant in organized crime. Rather than curtail this judicial interpretation,
Congress extensively revised RICO in 1984 to broaden the law, including the
addition of forfeiture provisions.125 By this time, the use of RICO in whitecollar and political corruption cases, as well as the widespread use of civil
RICO, was well established.126 While today’s uses may not have been
foreseeable, Congress was aware of RICO’s application beyond traditional
notions of organized crime when it revised the law in 1984.127
The liberal construction clause of the OCCA, section 904(a), further
supports a broad interpretation by expressly providing that “[t]he provisions
of [RICO] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”128
Adding strength to this directive is the fact that no other statute in the U.S.
Code that imposes criminal penalties mandates liberal construction.129 Thus,
this congressional directive specifically requires courts to adopt a liberal
approach when construing ambiguities within RICO.130 Despite its rather
clear instruction, this clause has been met with some resistance.131 The early
history of civil RICO is marked by certain courts’ unwillingness to apply the
statute to cases involving persons other than the stereotypical “mobster.”132
2. The Liberal Judicial Interpretation
The unwillingness to use RICO broadly came to a halt after the U.S.
Supreme Court undertook the task of clarifying the scope of civil RICO,
heeding the congressional mandate. The Supreme Court specifically
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
123. Lynch, supra note 117, at 774.
124. Id. Section 1962(d) prohibits conspiracy to violate any of the three preceding
subsections and is also often used. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
125. Lynch, supra note 117, at 775.
126. Id.
127. Under the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, Congress’s failure to enact opposing
legislation is an indication of its implied agreement with the statute’s interpretation. See, e.g.,
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 601 (1983) (“Congress’ failure to act on the
bills proposed on this subject provides added support for concluding that Congress acquiesced
in the IRS rulings . . . .”).
128. 21 U.S.C. § 853(o) (2012).
129. Craig W. Palm, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167,
168 n.6 (1980).
130. Id. at 175 (finding no constitutional impediments to the express liberal construction
mandate).
131. For a general discussion of the principles of statutory construction and the controversy
over the constitutionality of the liberal construction clause, see id.
132. Anne Melley, The Stretching of Civil RICO: Pro-Life Demonstrators Are
Racketeers?, 56 UMKC L. REV. 287, 291 (1988) (discussing the judicial interpretation of civil
RICO).
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addressed the liberal construction clause in United States v. Turkette,133
where the Court considered whether the term “enterprise” as used in RICO
encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. While the Court
determined that the plain language and structure of the statute did not limit
its application to legitimate enterprises, it nevertheless followed the directive
set forth in section 904(a) of the OCCA.134 Using legislative history as
guidance, the Court determined that RICO was both a preventive and
remedial measure to deal with organized crime infiltrating legitimate
businesses and should be interpreted to include a broader definition of
“enterprise.”135
Following suit, the Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.136 reiterated that
RICO should be read broadly. Rejecting the Second Circuit’s narrow reading
of the statute, the Court refused to find that a criminal conviction on the
underlying predicate offenses was a prerequisite to bringing a civil RICO
action.137 The Court also refused to require a “racketeering injury” separate
from the harm from the predicate acts.138 At the end of its opinion, the Court
recognized that civil RICO had evolved into something different from its
original conception and that almost all actions were being brought against
defendants other than the “archetypal, intimidating mobster.”139 Yet, the
Court concluded that this “defect—if defect it is—is inherent in the statute as
written, and its correction must lie with Congress.”140
The Supreme Court’s liberal pronouncement of civil RICO’s application
has made it “a formidable weapon for plaintiffs in civil litigation” and has
fostered widespread application of the statute to matters beyond traditional
organized crime.141 For example, in 1989, a women’s health center
successfully instituted a private civil RICO action against antiabortion
protesters.142 Despite the defendants’ argument that the center’s application
of RICO exceeded the statute’s purpose, the Third Circuit held that civil

133. 452 U.S. 576 (1981). The enterprise in this case was a group of individuals associatedin-fact for the purpose of engaging in criminal activities, including arson, insurance fraud, and
illegal trafficking in drugs. Id. at 579.
134. Id. at 580–87; see also 21 U.S.C. § 853(o) (2012).
135. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588–93; see also H.J. Inc., v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229
(1989) (reiterating that RICO was broadly written to encompass a wide range of criminal
activity and noting that narrow construction of the statute would be contrary to congressional
intent).
136. 473 U.S. 479 (1985). In this case, the Court adjudicated a dispute over a joint venture
in which Sedima alleged the respondent presented inflated bills, cheating Sedima out of a
portion of its proceeds by collecting for nonexistent expenses. Id. at 483.
137. Id. at 493.
138. Id. at 495.
139. Id. at 499–500.
140. Id. at 499.
141. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq.—Supreme Court
Cases, 171 A.L.R. Fed. 1st, § 2 (2001).
142. See generally Ne. Women’s Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989)
(holding that activists could be liable under RICO for their intimidation and harassment of the
center resulting in destruction of its property).
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RICO could appropriately be applied to the defendants’ intimidation and
harassment.143
3. Civil RICO Efforts to Combat Health-Care Fraud
Using civil RICO to combat health-care fraud is not novel.144 Since 2010,
civil RICO has been repeatedly employed in class action suits against
pharmaceutical companies,145 allowing for further expansion of the statute’s
application. These cases provide significant guidance for plaintiffs who sue
pharmaceutical companies under civil RICO.146 Although this Note seeks to
place civil RICO liability on authors involved in publishing bias rather than
pharmaceutical companies, this guidance is useful insofar as it stresses the
importance of the theory of liability.147
In UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co.,148 a number of unions and insurers
brought a putative class action against Eli Lilly claiming civil RICO
predicated on mail fraud and conspiracy to violate RICO.149 These claims
were based on the plaintiffs’ contention that Eli Lilly made false statements
and omitted material information concerning the safety and efficacy of its
drug, Zyprexa, including disseminating false information about the drug’s
risks.150
The plaintiffs alleged a chain of causation in which Lilly distributed
misinformation about Zyprexa that the physicians relied upon in prescribing
the drug, which caused the plaintiffs, as third-party payors (TTPs), to
overpay.151 However, the Second Circuit found that this narrative “obscures
the more attenuated link between the alleged misrepresentations made to
doctors and the ultimate injury.”152 It fails to consider that the TTPs relied
on advice from other parties to place Zyprexa on their lists of approved
medications and then failed to negotiate the drug’s price below the level set

143. Id. at 1357. The court found that the defendants’ description of their conduct as “civil
disobedience” did not immunize them from statutes that prohibit the very acts that the
defendants were found to have committed and that the tangible damage to the center’s medical
equipment resulting from the protesters’ forcible entry was all that RICO required to establish
injury. Id. at 1348–49.
144. See Pamela Bucy Pierson, RICO Trends: From Gangsters to Class Actions, 65 S.C.
L. REV. 213, 258 (2013) (noting that more than half of RICO class actions allege some type of
health-care fraud).
145. See, e.g., Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, 634 F.3d 1352,
1357 (11th Cir. 2011); UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2010);
United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa. & Reg’l Health & Welfare Fund v. Amgen,
Inc., 400 F. App’x 255, 256 (9th Cir. 2010).
146. See Pierson, supra note 144, at 256.
147. See id.
148. 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010).
149. Id. at 121–37.
150. Id. at 129. Plaintiffs argued that they were injured by paying for Zyprexa prescriptions
that (1) would not have been issued but for the alleged misrepresentations and (2) that were at
a higher price than would have been charged absent the alleged misrepresentations. Id. at 123.
151. Id. at 134.
152. Id.
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by Eli Lilly, leading to overpayment.153 Thus, the chain of causation “rests
on the independent actions of third and even fourth parties,” and therefore
must fail.154
Similarly, in Southeast Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer
Corp.,155 a welfare fund, which reimbursed plan members for covered
medical expenses, brought a RICO class action against Bayer. The complaint
alleged that Bayer, aware of the adverse effects of its drug, Trasylol, launched
an aggressive marketing campaign containing false or misleading statements
to justify the drug’s price of over $1000 per dose.156 The Eleventh Circuit
held that the fund failed to explain how or why Bayer’s alleged suppression
of information caused it to pay for Trasylol.157 That is, the fund failed to
demonstrate that it would have independently determined that the drug was
not “medically necessary”—a requirement for payment—if Bayer had
disclosed the allegedly suppressed information.158 If the fund had stated facts
plausibly demonstrating that it would not have bought Trasylol had it known
the true information, a direct relation would have been established. Without
such facts, the complaint failed to meet the direct relation requirement.159
While the courts above found the plaintiffs’ injuries too attenuated to
constitute proximate cause, this issue can be avoided. This Note focuses on
a class of plaintiffs—the medical journal and its subscribers—who are
directly injured by publication bias and whose rights may be vindicated by
civil RICO.
C. Elements of Civil RICO and Their Applicability
to Medical Ghostwriting
Medical journals publish articles that fail to accurately represent the results
of clinical trials, which are ghostwritten by outside companies and authored
by prominent physicians.160 Because the medical journals do not intend to
publish misleading information, they cannot have the requisite intent
necessary to withstand an allegation of fraud under civil RICO. Even so, the
physicians who sign their names to articles they had little to no part in
drafting may have the required intent. This Part applies the elements of civil
RICO to physicians who sign on to ghostwritten articles and considers
whether such a theory is viable.

153. Id. The court found that the evidence in the record supported the conclusion that
prescribing doctors generally do not consider the price of a medication when deciding what to
prescribe for an individual patient. Id. at 133–34. Thus, any reliance by doctors on
misrepresentations as to the efficacy and side effects of a drug was not a but for cause of the
price that TTPs ultimately paid for each prescription. Id.
154. See id. at 134 (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 11 (2010)).
155. 444 F. App’x 401 (11th Cir. 2011).
156. Id. at 403.
157. Id. at 410.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. See supra Part I.C.
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1. Who Can Bring the Civil RICO Claim?
To bring suit in federal court, plaintiffs must have standing.161 “Standing”
refers to whether a litigant is entitled to have a court decide the merits of the
particular issue or dispute.162 While a claim may have merit, the claimant
may nevertheless be denied access to the courts because he or she is not the
proper party to bring the suit.163 In that case, the claimant lacks standing.
The plain language of civil RICO permits “[a]ny person” injured to bring
a claim.164 This general grant of statutory standing, combined with the
statute’s plaintiff-enticing treble damages, caused courts to fashion a variety
of standing requirements intending to limit access to the federal courts.165
In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,166 the Supreme Court
established proximate cause as the appropriate standard for civil RICO
standing.167 This standard demands that the plaintiff prove a direct relation
between the asserted injury and the alleged conduct.168 It is not enough to
allege that a defendant’s acts were the but-for cause of a plaintiff’s injuries.169
The Court used the proximate cause standard to permit the flexible judicial
tools in determining a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that
person’s actions.170 The Court noted that its concept of proximate cause
reflected both a notion of justice and judicial convenience.171 The direct
relation requirement is a central element because when injury is less direct,
(1) it becomes more difficult to “ascertain the amount of a plaintiff’s damages
attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors”; (2)
courts are forced “to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among
plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts”; and
(3) an interest in deterring injurious conduct is not justified because “directly
injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private
attorneys general” without incurring the problems faced by remotely injured
plaintiffs.172 The Court determined that focusing upon the direct relationship
161. Ryan C. Morris, Proximate Cause and Civil RICO Standing: The Narrowly
Restrictive and Mechanical Approach in Lerner v. Fleet Bank and Baisch v. Gallina, 2004
BYU L. REV. 739, 745.
162. Morris, supra note 161, at 745.
163. Id. at 746.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
165. See Morris, supra note 162, at 755–59.
166. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
167. Id. at 268; see also, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985)
(rejecting the argument that RICO claims could only be brought against defendants convicted
of criminal charges who sustained a racketeering injury, which was distinct from the injury
occurring as a result of the predicate acts themselves).
168. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268. Looking to RICO’S legislative history, the Supreme Court
found it significant that the Clayton Act, upon which RICO was based, was interpreted at the
time of RICO’s enactment as requiring proximate cause. Id. at 267. The Court reasoned that
Congress knew of this interpretation when it passed RICO and thus intended for proximate
cause to be required to prevail on a RICO claim. Id. at 268.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 269–70.
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between the conduct and the harm avoids these complications.173 This direct
relation requirement prevents uncertain inquiries from overrunning RICO
litigation.174
A direct relationship may be shown where a plaintiff is able to demonstrate
that factors other than the alleged RICO conduct did not contribute to her
injury.175 While this establishes a high standard for the plaintiff to meet, it is
not necessary for the plaintiff to prove she relied on the alleged predicate
acts.176 The statute’s broad language of “any person” suggests a “breadth of
coverage not easily reconciled with an implicit requirement that the plaintiff
show reliance in addition to injury.”177 Thus, proximate cause requires only
a showing that someone relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation leading
directly to the plaintiff’s injury.178
Section 1964(c) requires a person to be “injured in his business or
property.”179 While society should be most concerned with the physical
injury to patients resulting from treatment decisions influenced by medical
literature, this injury is too attenuated from the alleged fraud to satisfy
RICO’s standing requirement.180 Instead, the direct injury resulting from
fraudulent authorship is to the medical journal and its subscribers.181 The
harm to the medical journal involves the cost of publishing the fraudulent
article.182 The harm to the subscribers involves the monetary value of the
journal subscription containing the fraudulently authored article.183
A journal subscription price184 represents a compilation of articles that
adhere to the journal’s guidelines, since the journal would refuse to publish
an article if it were known that the article failed to meet its publication
173. Id.
174. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 460 (2006) (declining to find
proximate cause after finding that the direct victim of the alleged RICO violation involving
tax fraud was the State of New York, not the plaintiff, and further, plaintiff’s loss of market
share could have been caused by a number of factors independent of the alleged tax fraud).
175. See id. at 459.
176. See Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 657–58 (2008) (finding that
first-party reliance is not necessary to ensure that there is a sufficiently direct relationship
between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the plaintiff’s injury to satisfy the proximate
cause principles).
177. Id. at 649.
178. See id. at 659.
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
180. See supra Part II.B.3.
181. Although there is also reputational harm to the medical journal itself, such harm is
considered a personal injury and is therefore not an injury recognized under civil RICO. See,
e.g., Santana v. Cook Cty. Bd. of Review, 679 F.3d 614, 623 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that
statements, which may amount to defamation under state law, do not advance a viable claim
under § 1964(c), even if the defamation results in a loss of income).
182. With annual revenue of $9.4 billion in 2011, analysts estimate profit margins at 20–
30 percent for the science-publishing industry, so the average cost to the publisher of
producing an article is likely to be around $3500 to $4000. See Richard Van Noorden, Open
Access: The True Cost of Science Publishing, 495 NATURE 426, 427 (2013).
183. See Stern & Lemmens, supra note 100, at 3.
184. For example, an annual regular membership to the American Medical Association,
which grants access to JAMA, is $420 for physicians. See AMA MEMBERSHIP DUES,
https://www.ama-assn.org/membership/ama-membership-dues
[https://perma.cc/TT4L2D9D] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
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requirements. However, an author’s false claim of authorship deceives the
journal into believing the article has met authorship requirements and induces
the journal to publish the article, thereby occupying valuable journal
space.185 The subscribers then lose the opportunity to read a legitimate article
that satisfies the journal’s publication requirements, diminishing subscription
value.186 The plaintiffs would only need to allege facts showing that the
ghostwritten article was fraudulently authored and subsequently published in
a journal that the subscribers paid for.187 While the individual claim of a
subscriber or medical journal may be insignificant, treble damages for the
aggregate claims of all subscribers and the medical journal have the potential
to be substantial.188
Failure to allege a viable theory of proximate cause has been the downfall
of civil RICO actions by medical journals against pharmaceutical
companies.189 To prevail on proximate causation, the medical journal must
show a direct relationship between the cost of publication and the physician’s
alleged fraudulent authorship. Specifically, it must demonstrate that it would
not have published the article had it known of the fraudulent authorship.
Fraudulently authored articles fail to meet journals’ publication requirements
and therefore would not be considered for publication, providing useful
support for this theory.
Likewise, the subscribers must sufficiently allege a direct relationship
between their overpayment for the medical journal subscription and the
physician’s alleged fraudulent authorship. The subscribers must demonstrate
that they would not have paid the same price for a journal that contains a
fraudulent article as they would have for a journal that contains articles that
meet authorship requirements. Stern and Lemmens argue that knowledge of
ghostwriting undermines the ghostwritten article’s credibility.190 Because
these articles have the potential to influence treatment decisions, an article
with less credibility is necessarily less valuable to the reading physician. Yet
it is irrelevant whether the subscriber even reads the fraudulent article.191
The fraudulent article replaces a more creditable article that would have
conformed to the journal’s requirements, thereby depriving the subscriber of
the full value of the subscription.192
Additionally, the subscribers do not have to demonstrate that they relied
on the fraudulent authorship due to the Supreme Court holding that civil
RICO does not require the plaintiff to show first-hand reliance.193 The direct
relationship between the plaintiffs’ injury and the physician’s fraudulent
conduct is clear: a physician fraudulently authors an article that is
subsequently published by a journal, thereby decreasing the value of the
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See Stern & Lemmens, supra note 100, at 3.
See id.
See id. at 4.
See id. at 3.
See, e.g., supra Part II.B.3.
See Stern & Lemmens, supra note 100, at 3.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 175–83 and accompanying text.
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journal subscription. The plaintiffs, therefore, have the requisite proximate
cause standing required under § 1962(c) to bring a claim against the
physicians for decreasing the value of the journal subscription.
2. The Elements of Civil RICO
RICO’s operative section sets forth four substantive offenses prohibiting
forms of enterprise activity.194 Along with at least one substantive offense,
a civil RICO violation requires, by a preponderance of the evidence, a
showing of (1) a person participating in (2) a pattern of racketeering activity
(3) in connection with the acquisition, maintenance, conduct, or control of an
enterprise.195
a. Racketeering Activity
An act of “racketeering activity” is the predicate act that forms the
foundation of a civil RICO claim. The plaintiff must first prove the elements
of the crime alleged as the racketeering activity. Congress defined
“racketeering activity” as any act “chargeable” under state or federal law, any
act “indictable” under federal criminal provisions, and any offense under
federal law involving bankruptcy fraud, securities fraud, or drug-related
activities.196 This includes a vast list of prohibited acts that Congress has
incorporated by reference in the requisite provision.197 In particular, mail
fraud and wire fraud are included in the statutory definition,198 helping to
facilitate the expansive application of civil RICO in litigation.
With regard to medical ghostwriting, the predicate act that forms the
foundation of a plaintiff’s civil RICO claim is mail fraud.199 Mail fraud
occurs whenever a person, “having devised or intending to devise any scheme
or artifice to defraud” uses the mail “for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do.”200 In interpreting this statute, the
Supreme Court held that any mailing that is incident to a fraudulent scheme
satisfies the mailing element.201 Further, the plaintiff does not need to prove
intent or that the defendant engaged in the physical act of mailing.202 It is
sufficient that the defendant knew or should have known that the use of the
mail would follow in the ordinary course of business.203
Here, a physician who authored an article she did not significantly
contribute to had a scheme to defraud plaintiffs. Indeed, a physician agrees
194. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(d) (2012).
195. Id. § 1962(c); see also Lievsay, supra note 113, at 1742.
196. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
200. Id.
201. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954) (holding that the mail fraud statute
was violated where a scheme to defraud was established and the mailing of a check by the
bank was an “essential part of that scheme”).
202. Id. at 8–9.
203. Id.
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to authorship so the journal and its readers believe that the physician
significantly contributed to the work illustrated in the publication. This is
precisely what the warranty of authorship conveys. The scheme to defraud
is bolstered by the potential impact publication has on a physician’s career.204
The recognition and prestige that flow from publication incent a physician to
make others believe she contributed substantially to a published work. Even
if a defendant-physician did not physically mail the fraudulently authored
publication, she would have known journals would be mailed to subscribers
in the ordinary course. In fact, authorship only becomes meaningful to a
physician once it is disseminated to the public. Therefore, the mailing, as a
way to convey this information to the public, is not merely incidental—it is
essential to the fraudulent scheme.205
As a procedural matter, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), the act
of mail fraud must be alleged with particularity.206 To satisfy this rule, a
plaintiff must identify the statements or representations made by the
defendant that were actually false or misleading at the time they were
made.207 Thus, rather than broadly alleging that a physician engaged in
fraudulent authorship, plaintiffs must point to the specific articles that contain
fraudulent authorship to satisfy Rule 9(b).
b. Pattern of Racketeering Activity
A defendant’s engagement in racketeering activity is not enough to satisfy
the statute. RICO further requires that a defendant act through a “pattern of
racketeering activity.”208 Congress defined “pattern of racketeering activity”
as “at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after
[October 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years . . . after
the commission of a prior act.”209 Thus, every RICO claim must involve at
least two predicate acts occurring within ten years.
While it was generally accepted that the commission of any two predicate
acts constituted a pattern, the Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co.210 expressed in dicta its dissatisfaction with courts’ broad construction
of the pattern requirement.211 In a footnote that ultimately did little to guide
204. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
205. Today, articles published in medical journals are often available on a journal’s
website, changing the predicate act from mail fraud to wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)
(2012).
206. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
207. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa. & Reg’l Health & Welfare
Fund v. Amgen, Inc., 400 F. App’x 255, 256 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, a welfare fund alleged
that the defendant pharmaceutical company violated RICO by engaging in deceptive
advertising that misrepresented the safety of off-label uses. Id. at 257. The court held that the
plaintiff failed to plead its allegations of fraud under RICO, emphasizing that a mere assertion
that a company promoted its drug for ineffective or unapproved uses will not satisfy Rule 9(b).
Id. Instead, the plaintiff must point to specific misrepresentations made by the defendant. Id.
at 257–58.
208. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
209. Id. § 1961(5).
210. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
211. Id. at 496 n.14.
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lower courts,212 the Court attempted to refine RICO by holding that the
predicate acts must show continuity and relatedness.213 These two prongs
were later clarified in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.214
Because Congress was concerned with long-term concerted criminal
conduct, the Court held that the pattern requirement necessitates (1) a
relationship between activities, established by a series of factors215 and (2)
the threat of continuing activity.216 Because most predicate acts are
sufficiently related, the continuity prong frequently proves most challenging
to a plaintiff asserting a civil RICO claim.
The key factor in determining whether the threat of continuing activity
exists is the duration of the alleged racketeering activity.217 The prong is
adequately pleaded only where the plaintiff has alleged “closed-ended” or
“open-ended” continuity, referring to either a closed period of repeated
conduct or to past conduct that by its nature projects a threat of future
repetition.218 To demonstrate continuity over a closed period, the plaintiff
must provide a series of related predicates that have extended over a
substantial period of time.219 Acts extending over a few weeks or months,
without the threat of future criminal conduct, will not satisfy the
requirement.220 In fact, even two years of related predicates may not be long
enough to constitute continuity.221
While closed-ended continuity is primarily a temporal concept, courts
consider a number of factors in determining whether the requirement is
met.222 The factors include the number and variety of predicate acts, the

212. Patrick J. Ryan, Note, The Civil RICO Pattern Requirement: Continuity and
Relationship, a Fatal Attraction?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 964 (1988). For a discussion of
the lower courts’ confusion over what constitutes a pattern within the meaning of § 1962(c)
that spawned from Sedima, see id. at 64–65.
213. See Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
214. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
215. See id. at 239–40. The Court turned to another provision of the OCCA, Title X, where
“pattern” was defined as “acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants,
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events” and determined that there was no reason to believe
RICO’s pattern component required a more “constrained” notion of relationship. Id.
216. See id. at 240 (“RICO’s legislative history tells us, however, that the relatedness of
racketeering activities is not alone enough to satisfy § 1962’s pattern element. To establish a
RICO pattern it must also be shown that the predicates themselves amount to, or that they
otherwise constitute a threat of, continuing racketeering activity.”).
217. See Pierson, supra note 144, at 230 (discussing the importance of longevity in
establishing a pattern under RICO).
218. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241 (asserting that “continuity is both a closed-ended and openended concept”).
219. Id. at 242.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Roger Whitmore’s Auto. Servs., Inc. v. Lake City, 424 F.3d 659, 673 (7th
Cir. 2005) (noting that the court has not hesitated to find that closed periods of several months
to several years did not qualify as “substantial” enough to satisfy continuity).
222. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242 (“Whether the predicates proved establish a threat of
continued racketeering activity depends on the specific facts of each case.”).
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length of time over which they were committed, the number of victims, the
presence of separate schemes,223 and the distinct injuries involved.224
To demonstrate open-ended continuity, a plaintiff must show that the
predicate acts establish a threat of continued racketeering activity projecting
into the future.225 Both the nature of the predicate acts and the nature of the
alleged enterprise are relevant. Where the enterprise primarily conducts a
legitimate business, the plaintiff must show the predicate acts were the
regular way the enterprise conducts its business or that the predicate acts, by
their very nature, threaten continued criminal activity.226
A plaintiff alleging a civil RICO violation against a medical ghostwriting
first must identify a physician who engaged in at least two acts of fraudulent
authorship within ten years. Proving that the acts satisfy relatedness is
relatively straightforward. The relatedness factors of purpose, victims, and
method involved, are similar in every act of fraudulent authorship.227 When
a physician lends her name to an article, her purpose is to be published. The
victims are the medical journals and deceived readers. And the method
involved is a drafted manuscript presented to a physician for written
approval.228 Multiple instances of fraudulent authorship, therefore, likely
can be connected to one another.
The continuity prong of the pattern requirement may be more difficult to
establish. Yet the factors that courts consider when determining closedended continuity may be a viable method of establishing continuity for a
223. While the number of schemes may be a factor, the Supreme Court has explicitly
rejected the rigid notion that a pattern is formed only when predicate acts are part of separate
schemes. Id. at 236–37. Instead, multiple predicate acts within a single scheme may constitute
criminal activities that have long-term and widespread consequences. See id.
224. Park v. Jack’s Food Sys., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 914, 920 (D. Md. 1995) (noting that the
Fourth Circuit has adopted a “case-by-case, fact specific approach” in determining whether
the continuity requirement is met). Other circuit courts look to similar factors in assessing
whether the closed-ended concept of continuity has been satisfied. See, e.g., Columbia Nat.
Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1110 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that factors include the duration
of the racketeering activity, the number of different schemes, the number of predicates, the
types of injury, and the number of victims and perpetrators); Barticheck v. Fid. Union
Bank/First Nat’l State, 832 F.2d 36, 38–39 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying factors including the
number of unlawful acts, the length of time over which they were committed, the similarity of
the acts, the number of victims and perpetrators, and the character of the unlawful activity);
Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that factors include
the number and variety of predicate acts, the length of time over which they were committed,
the number of victims, the presence of separate schemes, and the occurrence of distinct
injuries); Gross v. Waywell, 628 F. Supp. 2d 475, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying factors such
as the number and variety of predicate acts, the number of participants and victims and the
presence of separate schemes).
225. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241.
226. See, e.g., Cofacredit, S.A. v. Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., 187 F.3d 229, 243–44
(2d Cir. 1999) (finding insufficient evidence to support a claim that mail and wire fraud were
a regular means of doing business).
227. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
228. Documents revealed in relation to Wyeth’s hormone replacement therapy show that
“company executives came up with ideas for medical journal articles, titled them, drafted
outlines, paid writers to draft the manuscripts, recruited academic authors and identified
publications to run the articles—all without disclosing the companies’ roles to journal editors
or readers.” Wilson, supra note 93.
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plaintiff. Because of the importance of publication to physicians’ careers and
the relationship between physicians and pharmaceutical companies,229 it is
reasonable to assume that physicians agree to author numerous articles
throughout their careers. One doctor even reported that the request to author
ghostwritten articles “happens all the time.”230 The authoring of numerous
articles spanning over a physician’s career would constitute a large number
of predicate acts lasting well beyond two years, favoring plaintiffs. While
there are similar injuries and a similar goal of obtaining publication, each act
of authoring a ghostwritten article represents a distinct scheme. Further, the
vast number of victims—the duped medical journals and overpaying
subscribers—may tip the scale toward finding that series of related predicates
extended over a substantial period of time.
Alternatively, the plaintiffs would need to show a threat of continuing
criminal activity beyond the period during which the predicate acts were
performed. The strongest evidence of continued future activity would be an
agreement between the authoring physician and pharmaceutical company
showing an ongoing understanding that the physician’s name would be used
to author future ghostwritten articles. This does not necessarily have to be a
formal contract but may be in the form of emails between a pharmaceutical
company and a physician eliciting authorship for future publications. Indeed,
this would be an explicit threat that likely would satisfy the continuity prong
necessary to establish a pattern of racketeering activity.
c. Enterprise
The conduct prohibited in § 1962 is unlawful only if it occurs in connection
with an “enterprise.” RICO generally targets the bad actors who misuse a
legitimate enterprise rather than the enterprise itself. RICO defines enterprise
as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity.”231 Through its broad statutory language void of limiting or restrictive
provisions, this definition recognizes both formal structures and groups of
individuals as enterprises.232 However, this definition takes on a distinct
meaning when referred to under § 1962(c). Unlike the other types of conduct
covered under civil RICO, a person under § 1962(c) is limited to someone
who is employed by or associated with an enterprise.233 Because § 1962(c)
is used to pursue individuals who use an organization and its resources to
229. A 2007 survey showed that 94 percent of physicians reported having a relationship
with pharmaceutical companies. Eric G. Campbell et al., A National Survey of PhysicianIndustry Relationships, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1742, 1743 (2007).
230. See Natasha Singer, Senator Moves to Block Medical Ghostwriting, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
18,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/19/health/research/19ethics.html?fta=y
[https://perma.cc/H9HL-D9E6].
231. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2012).
232. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (“There is no restriction upon
the associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise includes any union or group of
individuals associated in fact.”).
233. Any person may be charged with violations of § 1962(a), (b), or (d). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a)–(b), (d).
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commit racketeering activity, courts have required that the defendant be
separate and distinct from the enterprise where the alleged racketeering was
conducted.234 Indeed, “enterprise” connotes the vehicle through which the
pattern of racketeering activity is committed.235
Many of the physicians solicited to author ghostwritten articles are
affiliates of hospitals or, more commonly, academic institutions.236 The
affiliation with a hospital or academic institution contributes to the
physician’s prestige, which facilitates the solicitation to author an article in
the first place. These institutions therefore serve as the enterprise in which
the pattern of racketeering activity occurs. Therefore, physicians are
“employed by or associated with” their respective institutions within the
meaning of § 1962(c).
III. REVISING THE CURRENT
MEDICAL PUBLICATION FRAMEWORK
Given the challenges of bringing a successful civil RICO claim, revising
the current medical publication framework offers a better means of
addressing publication bias in medical research. To combat such bias, this
Part proposes greater enforcement of FDAAA disclosure requirements, as
well as the implementation of a mandatory disclosure rule.
A. Challenges to Bringing a Civil RICO Claim
While this Note proposes a viable cause of action under civil RICO against
physicians who lent their names to ghostwritten articles, the claim
nevertheless poses an uphill battle for plaintiffs. Establishing a pattern of
racketeering activity likely presents the greatest challenge to a successful
claim. Although there is speculation that many physicians engage in
ghostwriting practices throughout their careers, generating proof of such
engagement will be difficult.237
A RICO claim against a physician necessarily rests on establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that articles are ghostwritten. These articles
are not typically exposed until an investigation has been conducted through
litigation. Ideally, a civil RICO action would be brought against the involved
physician alongside a larger action against the pharmaceutical company
whose activities drew attention from regulators or the press. Because of the
vast amount of time involved in drug development, an investigation into a
specific pharmaceutical company’s handling of a drug may reveal numerous
articles from the same author spanning over many years. Even so, such
234. Pierson, supra note 144, at 237; see, e.g., United States v. Goldin Indus., Inc., 219
F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that, consistent with every other circuit that has
addressed the question, the defendant in a § 1962(c) claim must be separate and distinct from
the “enterprise” named therein).
235. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 259 (1994).
236. See Singer, supra note 230 (noting the growing body of evidence that suggests doctors
at top medical schools have been attaching their names to scientific papers that were drafted
by ghostwriters working for drug companies).
237. See supra text accompanying note 230.
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litigation is uncommon. A drug first must cause considerable harm to the
public to initiate litigation.
To make matters worse, even after ghostwriting is exposed, physicians
who have served as authors often remain unnamed. Thus, although many
articles may be ghostwritten, the majority of these articles will go unnoticed,
and the fraudulent authors will remain unknown. Because civil RICO
requires pattern of fraudulent activity, only repeat offenders—the physicians
who regularly engage in ghostwriting practices—can be found liable. This
insulates a large number of physicians from civil RICO liability, even though
their ghostwriting undoubtedly negatively affects public health.
In addition to these substantive issues, litigation costs may dissuade
plaintiffs from bringing civil RICO claims. The potential of recovery, even
if aggregated and trebled, may be nominal compared to the transaction costs
inherent in such a claim.238
There have also been many critiques of expanding civil RICO beyond its
legislative intent.239 In fact, the Supreme Court expressed its concern that
the statute was being used in ways that Congress may not have envisioned.240
Holding physicians liable under civil RICO may therefore be met with harsh
criticism because of reluctance to link physicians to a statute originally
intended for criminals.
In response to these criticisms, employing civil RICO to hold ghostwriting
physicians liable is necessary to stop biased practices that harm public
welfare. Journal authorship requirements and academic bans on ghostwriting
have not fully eradicated this harmful practice. Thus, the deterrent effect that
the threat of litigation carries becomes appealing when the health of the
nation is at stake. Holding physicians responsible for their contributions to
ghostwriting will likely promote self-policing in the medical community.
Physicians, who have taken an oath to do no harm, may be less likely to
engage in a practice that is now a cognizable harm and may urge their fellow
colleagues to do the same. The threat of liability will shift the current culture
of permissible dishonesty to a culture of transparency. Even if problematic,
this is a valuable and necessary threat. Enforcement and revision of the
current regulations governing medical publication, combined with the threat
of civil RICO liability, stands the best chance at effectively stemming the
continued practice of medical ghostwriting.

238. See, e.g., Xavier Bosch et al., Challenging Medical Ghostwriting in U.S. Courts,
PLOS MED., Jan. 2012, at 1 (arguing that the costs of bringing a RICO claim would likely
discourage law firms from prosecuting such cases because of “the novelty of the theories, and
the nominal damages at issue”).
239. See generally Tricia Bozyk, Disgorging American Business: An Examination of
Overbroad Remedies in Civil RICO Cases, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 129 (2006) (arguing that the
remedies available to the government and private plaintiffs bringing civil RICO claims should
be limited); Eric Lloyd, Making Civil RICO “Suave”: Congress Must Act to Ensure
Consistent Judicial Interpretations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 123 (2007) (discussing the rise in civil RICO claims and federal
courts’ attempts to limit its scope).
240. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
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B. Enforcement of FDAAA Disclosure Requirements
Enforcing compliance with the FDAAA requirements for clinical trial
results is the first step in addressing issues of publication bias.241 While the
effects of the most recent final rule are still unknown, the FDA must take
more active measures in regulating the national registry. Any study that is
registered on the FDAAA website must also disclose the results, and the FDA
must promptly notify noncompliant parties and enforce applicable
penalties.242 Interestingly, the penalty for noncompliance was not increased
in the final rule.243 While civil monetary penalties of up to $10,000 per day
may cripple a study run by an independent researcher, studies funded by
pharmaceutical companies will likely be unaffected by such a low penalty.
A separate penalty should therefore be placed on studies funded by drug
companies in an amount that will sufficiently deter the companies from
noncompliance.
However, the clinical trial results, even if disclosed, would do little to
protect public health if prescribing physicians fail to see them. To make the
clinical trial results accessible to physicians, medical journals should provide
a citation to the relevant results on the national registry within the drug’s
publication. The reading physician, at her own discretion, will then be
prompted to review the full clinical trial results of the particular drug under
consideration. Physicians will, at the very least, be aware that the publication
does not explain the full story and will tailor their practices accordingly.
C. Mandatory Disclosure of Authorship
Ghostwriting involves fraudulent authorship, but the pharmaceutical
industry’s practice of hiring external companies to draft manuscripts for
publication is not, in itself, fraudulent. In fact, it is a necessary industry
practice. Because of the volume of results generated in the development of
a new drug, pharmaceutical companies and investigators are unable to draft
all the literature associated with the results on their own.244 Professional
communication agencies therefore play an important role in the effective and
ethical promotion of a product.245 The needs of the pharmaceutical industry
must be taken into consideration when deciding how to resolve this public
health issue.
1. Mandatory Disclosure Rule
Rather than restricting pharmaceutical companies from outsourcing
manuscripts for publication or requiring that the researchers involved in the
original clinical trials draft the manuscripts, the less burdensome solution lies
241.
242.
243.
244.

See supra notes 49–64 and accompanying text.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Mark Hughes, Careers in Medical Writing: Regulatory Writing—What’s That Then?,
SCIENCE (May 4, 2001), http://www.sciencemag.org/careers/2001/05/careers-medicalwriting-regulatory-writing-whats-then [https://perma.cc/2C6V-8YQ6].
245. See id.
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in disclosure. Indeed, ghostwriting only becomes ghostwriting, and
consequentially fraudulent, when there is a lack of authorship disclosure. To
avoid issues of fraud, the FDA should institute rulemaking to enforce
mandatory disclosure of authorship. Authors should be required to disclose
the role they played in drafting the manuscript, and any author, whether
pharmaceutical company, medical communication agency, or physician,
should be acknowledged in the final publication. While the private ordering
by the ICMJE in recommending such disclosure provides certain
protection,246 public ordering in the form of a rule promulgated by the FDA
would create a uniform standard for all medical journals. A lack of
authorship disclosure would signal to physicians serving as authors and
editors of medical journals that an FDA violation likely occurred. All parties
would then have the opportunity to ensure that compliance is met. A rule
promulgated by the FDA would also announce to the medical community
that ghostwriting is not a mere moral failing but rather a legal violation
deserving of regulatory action.
Such regulation aimed at reducing biased prescribing practices is not
novel. Along with the enactment of the FDAAA, the FDA has imposed
advertising limitations on pharmaceutical companies.247 Additionally, in
response to the growing concern that gifts from pharmaceutical companies to
physicians distort judgment in prescribing practices, several state legislatures
have imposed limitations on gift giving.248 These limitations are justified
because gifts have been shown to entice health professionals into
relationships that subtly call for reciprocity, thereby influencing prescribing
behaviors.249 Similarly, the chance to author a prominent publication without
having to satisfy authorship criteria should be examined because it can be
seen as a gift from a drug company. Scrutiny here is justified because a
publication supporting the use of a particular drug authored by a prominent
physician entices other physicians to prescribe the drug. The ethical concern
in both situations is the same—distortion of physicians’ judgment in
246. See supra note 69.
247. See Shena T. Wheeler, Note, Under the Influence: An Examination of the Tactics
Pharmaceutical Companies Use to Manipulate Physicians, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 89, 102–
03 (2010) (discussing the external factors influencing physicians’ prescribing habits—
including advertising and gifts from pharmaceutical companies—and current regulations
designed to curb such practices).
248. For example, Massachusetts prohibits the exchange of all gifts from pharmaceutical
companies to physicians. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111N, § 2 (West 2008). Minnesota
prohibits pharmaceutical companies from giving physicians gifts with a total annual combined
retail value in excess of $50, subject to a few exceptions. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.461 (West
2008). Vermont bans gifts from drug manufacturers to healthcare professionals and requires
disclosure of allowable expenditures by manufacturers to the Attorney General. VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4632 (West 2009). Most recently, using the Vermont law as an example, the
California Senate passed a bill in May 2017 that would ban drug companies from giving gifts
to physicians. See Sophia Bollag, California Bill Would Ban Drug Company Gifts to Doctors,
U.S. NEWS (May 18, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/california/
articles/2017-05-18/california-may-bar-drug-makers-from-giving-doctors-gifts
[https://perma.cc/D756-LWB3] (noting that drug companies spend more than $1.4 billion a
year on gifts to California doctors).
249. See Wheeler, supra note 247, at 113.
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prescribing medicine. A similar solution should therefore be imposed in the
form of mandatory disclosure.
2. Constitutional Concern
One constitutional concern regarding mandatory disclosure is whether it
impedes on the exercise of free speech. In 1976, the Supreme Court
determined that the First Amendment protects commercial speech.250 Since
then, the FDA has had to confront the free speech rights of its regulated
entities. The extent of these rights, however, depends on whether the speech
is commercial or noncommercial, as the government enjoys much more
freedom to regulate the former.251 This disparity arises from the different
tests courts apply. For laws targeting commercial speech, courts apply
intermediate scrutiny, whereas laws targeting noncommercial speech receive
more stringent scrutiny.252 Intermediate scrutiny allows courts to ask
whether the content of commercial speech is false or misleading, opening the
door for content-based objections generally forbidden in noncommercial
contexts.253
The prevailing test to determine whether speech is commercial or not asks
(1) whether the speech is an advertisement, (2) whether it refers to a specific
product, and (3) whether the speaker has an economic motive.254 While
seemingly straightforward, this test becomes complicated in the context of
scientific speech, where companies make scientific claims about the health
and safety of their products. Courts have traditionally noted that scientific
articles, published for educational purposes, are a protected form of
noncommercial speech.255 Thus, the publication of an article addressing
scientific findings in a peer-reviewed journal generally does not constitute
commercial speech.
But at what point is protected scientific inquiry transformed into
commercial speech subject to stricter scrutiny? Courts have often found that
a scientific article becomes commercial speech when, for example, it contains
favorably false information about a product and is written by the company
that manufactures the product.256 Courts have adopted a skeptical view
250. See generally Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (applying the First Amendment to commercial speech and striking down a
Virginia statute prohibiting pharmacies from advertising prescription drug prices).
251. See generally Nathan Cortez, Can Speech by FDA-Regulated Firms Ever Be
Noncommercial?, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 388 (2011) (arguing for a framework that identifies
relevant factors courts can use to distinguish commercial from noncommercial speech). If
speech is commercial, the FDA can ensure that it is not false or misleading by requiring certain
speech or imposing certain limitations. Id. at 388. The FDA has much less control over
noncommercial speech. See id.
252. Id. at 390–91.
253. Id. at 390.
254. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983).
255. See, e.g., Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 384,
456 (D.N.J. 2009) (noting an “abundance of case law to support the proposition that a scientific
article is protected noncommercial speech despite the potential for erroneous content”).
256. See id. (citing Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 112 (6th Cir. 1995)); see also
Cortez supra note 251, at 405 (“There is a good argument that drug companies that hire
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towards FDA-regulated bodies, heeding Justice William Brennan’s warning
that “those who seek to convey commercial messages will engage in the most
imaginative of exercises to place themselves within the safe haven of
noncommercial speech, while at the same time conveying their commercial
message.”257 Professor Nathan Cortez found that out of twenty-four cases
where FDA-regulated entities claimed First Amendment protection, courts
categorized the speech as commercial in all but two.258
Pharmaceutical companies clearly engage in practices of publication bias
and increasingly use medical journals as a platform for marketing and selling
their products.259 The prevalence of publication bias demands that articles
published in medical journals be treated as commercial speech subject to
regulation by the FDA.260
While the government may protect consumers from false or misleading
information,261 it generally may not prohibit truthful and nondeceptive
claims in pursuit of other valuable ends.262 If the FDA goes beyond guarding
against the dissemination of false or misleading information and seeks to
promote broader public health goals, the agency will likely violate the First
Amendment. Therefore, the question this Note seeks to answer is whether
requiring mandatory disclosure of authorship protects consumers from false
or misleading information.
The answer to this question is yes. Requiring authors of ghostwritten
publications to disclose their level of involvement protects journals and their
subscribers from the false or misleading information conveyed through the
false warranty of authorship. Claiming authorship of an article that the
physician had no involvement in writing is neither a truthful nor a
nondeceptive claim. Without disclosing the author’s level of involvement,
the reader is led to believe that the physician named as the author is
responsible for the information conveyed. This, of course, would be false.
Therefore, the FDA has the constitutional authority to promulgate a
mandatory disclosure rule in an effort to protect the readers from false or
misleading information.

‘ghostwriters’ to publish positive scientific articles about their products are engaged in
commercial speech.”).
257. See Cortez supra note 251, at 392–93 (footnote omitted); see also United States v.
Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . . ., 394 U.S. 784, 778 (1969) (noting “the well-accepted
principle that remedial legislation such as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is to be given a
liberal construction consistent with the Act’s overriding purpose to protect the public health”).
258. See Cortez supra note 251, at 390.
259. See supra Part I.
260. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976) (“In concluding that commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected, we of
course do not hold that it can never be regulated in any way. Some forms of commercial
speech regulation are surely permissible.”).
261. See id. at 771 (“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected
for its own sake.”).
262. See id. at 773. See generally Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: Commercial Free
Speech vs. Public Health Promotion (at the FDA), 21 HEALTH MATRIX 31 (2011) (discussing
the constitutionality of the FDA’s restrictions on the advertising of therapeutic products to
physicians and patients).
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While mandating disclosure of authorship is not a panacea for all
misleading articles, disclosure of ghostwriting will signal to readers that an
article must be read with caution. There is the hope that, if legitimate authors
are held accountable for the content of a publication, all parties involved will
ensure that articles convey the most accurate representation of the results on
which they are based.
CONCLUSION
Medical journals contribute significantly to public health by disseminating
medical information to physicians, thereby influencing prescribing practices.
Yet, through selective publishing and medical ghostwriting, the information
guiding treatment decisions has become polluted and distorted, negatively
affecting patient care. Through the selective publication of clinical trial
results that show positive findings in support of a particular drug, prescribing
physicians are blind to the true effects of the medications they prescribe.
Worse yet, prescribing physicians can be unaware of the true author of a
publication, giving undue credence to an article based on the prestige of an
author recruited by a pharmaceutical company to serve as nothing more than
a mere signature.
While the medical community and regulators have made efforts to reduce
publication bias in medical research, this Note advocates a novel approach
by imposing civil RICO on physicians involved in medical ghostwriting.
Although Congress enacted RICO in response to the destruction caused by
organized crime’s infiltration of legitimate businesses, the statute’s broad and
liberal construction has facilitated its use to areas beyond traditional
organized crime, including its use in claims against the pharmaceutical
industry.
By applying the elements under § 1962(c), this Note concludes that using
civil RICO against physicians involved in ghostwriting is a viable. However,
because the pattern requirement under § 1962(c) will render a civil RICO
claim challenging, this Note also proposes alternative approaches to
addressing publication bias. By enforcing FDAAA compliance and imposing
a mandatory disclosure rule for authorship, prescribing physicians will have
access to all clinical trial results and will be made aware of potential bias in
the medical publications that guide their practices. The culture of
transparency that is created through the threat of litigation and regulatory
reform will ultimately lead to more informed, and consequently superior,
patient care, positively affecting public health.

